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ABSTRACT 
Facing the global ecological crisis, international 
organizations, national governments, financial institutions 
and private business have supported the idea of a green 
economy searching for win-win scenarios and public-
private partnerships.  Unfortunately, this perspective does 
not usually consider alternative conceptions of well-being, 
justice and happiness.  The case of the Barro Blanco 
hydroelectric project in Western Panama warns against 
the underlying assumptions of the prevailing 
environmental discourse of sustainable development.  
Unless development projects start considering different 
opinions, ideals and expectations, there will be the 
possibility for protracted conflict and severe 
environmental damage as happened with the forceful 
flooding of Ngäbe communities in a hydroelectric reservoir 
linked with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  As negotiations continue for new 
market-based mechanisms to mitigate climate change, 
lessons should be learned from the Barro Blanco debacle to 
find new pathways that reduce greenhouse emissions and 
at the same time respect human rights and indigenous 
worldviews and territoriality. 
 
Keywords:  Clean Development, Commodification of 
Nature, Green Economy, Indigenous Territoriality. 
 
RESUMO 
Encarando a crise ecológica global, organizações 
internacionais, governos nacionais, instituições 
financeiras e empresas privadas apoiam a ideia de 
uma economia verde procurando por cenários 
vantajosos para as duas partes e por parcerias 
público-privadas. Infelizmente, esta perspectiva nem 
sempre considera concepções alternativas de bem-
estar, justiça e felicidade. O caso do projeto 
hidroelétrico Barro Blanco no Panamá Ocidental 
alerta contra suposições subjacentes do discurso 
ambiental predominante no desenvolvimento 
sustentável. A menos que projetos em 
desenvolvimento comecem a considerar diferentes 
opiniões, ideais e expectativas, haverá a possibilidade 
de conflitos prolongados e um ambiente danificado 
como aconteceu com a inundação forçada das 
comunidades Ngäbe em um reservatório hidrelétrico 
ligado ao Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo 
(MDL) do Protocolo de Kyoto. Como as negociações 
continuam para os novos mecanismos assentes no 
mercado para atenuar a mudança climática, lições 
deviam ser aprendidas do  fracasso do Barro Blanco 
em encontrar novos caminhos que reduzem a emissão 
de gases de efeito estufa e, ao mesmo tempo, respeitar 
os direitos humanos e respeitar as visões de mundo e 
territorialidade dos indígenas. 
Palavras-chave: desenvolvimento limpo, 
mercantilização da natureza, economia verde, 
territorialidade indígena.  
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RESUMEN 
Encarando una crisis ecológica global, organizaciones internacionales, gobiernos nacionales, 
instituciones financieras y empresas privadas apoyan la idea de una economía verde buscando 
escenarios ventajosos   para todas las partes y asociaciones público-privadas. Infelizmente, esta 
perspectiva no siempre considera las concepciones alternativas de bienestar, justicia y felicidad. 
El caso del proyecto hidroeléctrico Barro Blanco en Panamá occidental alerta contra los 
supuestos subyacentes al discurso ambiental predominante en el desarrollo sostenible. A menos 
que los proyectos en desarrollo comiencen a considerar diferentes opiniones, ideas y 
expectativas, existirá la posibilidad de conflictos prolongados y un ambiente dañado, como 
ocurrió con la inundación forzada de las comunidades Ngäbe, en un reservorio hidroeléctrico 
ligado al Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio (MDL) del Protocolo de Kyoto. Como las 
negociaciones continúan para los nuevos mecanismos para atenuar el cambio climático basados 
en el mercado, las lecciones resultantes del fracaso en Barro Blanco deben de ser aprendidas con 
el fin de encontrar nuevos caminos que reduzcan la emisión de gases de efecto invernadero y, al 
mismo tiempo, respetar los derechos humanos y las visiones de mundo y la territorialidad de los 
indígenas. 
Palabras clave: desarrollo limpio, mercantilización de la naturaleza, economía verde, 
territorialidad indígena 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n the last quarter of a century, 
environmental regimes have been 
moving towards commodification 
of natural resources and 
allocation of private property rights to 
different entities such as NGOs, 
corporations, individuals (McAffee 
1999).  In the 1990s the paradigm of 
sustainable development digressed into 
the prevalence of market-based 
mechanisms that would be expected to 
create profit in the process of producing 
public goods.  A win-win logic began to 
permeate environmental discourse and 
practice as expressed in the creation of 
carbon trading in the Kyoto Protocol 
(1997) 
By Rio plus 20, the rising 
discourse of a “Green Economy” has 
extended to many policy areas such as 
forestry, water conservation and climate 
change (Tienhaara 2014, Goodman and 
Salleh 2013).  Unfortunately, this global 
trend oftentimes overlooked social and 
environmental externalities such as 
encroachment of indigenous territories 
and disruption of indigenous 
worldviews.  In many regards, the 
international environmental movement 
divided itself during the period between 
those movements and organizations that 
preferred alliances with the private 
sector (public-private-partnerships) and 
those who questioned the capacity of 
the capitalistic economy to respond 
effectively to global environmental 
challenges (Brand 2012, Prudham 2009, 
Lertzman and Vredenburg 2005).  More 
recently, academics from different 
continents have begun questioning the 
capacity of political concepts such as 
“development” and “sustainable 
development” to satisfy human needs, 
aspirations and different conceptions of 
what may constitute a “good life” 
(Khotari et al. 2014). 
This paper analyzes the case of 
the Barro Blanco dam in Western 
I 
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Panama where the UN Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the 
Kyoto Protocol provided a justification 
for dispossessing a sensitive part of the 
Ngäbe indigenous territory including 
the community of Kiabda, a main 
cultural center of the Mama Tata 
spiritual movement.  Despite manifest 
opposition to the flooding of these 
lands, a variety of non-indigenous 
actors defended the Project using as a 
justification reduction in carbon 
emissions, and the possibility to 
compensate the communities with 
revenues originating from carbon 
credits.
1
 The capitalistic logic of 
financial institutions, private 
companies, international organizations 
and national governments was 
congruent with a global understanding 
of environmental conservation as a 
business transaction yet conflicted with 
Ngäbe conceptions of property, justice 
and well-being. 
At the outset, those responsible 
for approving the branding of the Barro 
Blanco hydroelectric project as a carbon 
mitigation initiative seemed to ignore 
the century-long struggle of the Ngäbe 
people for territorial integrity and 
political autonomy (Velasquez-Runk 
2012, Jordan 2010a, Gjording 1994, 
Herrera 1989, Young 1971).  Several 
social scientists had referred extensively 
to conflicts associated with the 
construction of dams along the Tabasará 
River possibly linked to the 
                                                             
1
 The Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) created an offset mechanism known 
as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
that was expected to generate overall reduction 
in carbon emissions by allowing Annex I 
countries to exchange Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) with less developed 
countries (Non-Annex I).  An international 
market was created for the exchange of these 
CERs that could then be used to compensate 
projects that arguably contributed to emission 
reduction. 
construction of the Cerro Colorado 
Mining Complex.  In Panama 
demonstrations of the April 10 
Movement for the Defense of the 
Tabasará River (M10) had captured 
public attention since the early 2000s.  
Yet, both CDM promoters and 
European financial institutions 
portrayed the Barro Blanco dam as a 
different kind of initiative focused on 
energy production for national 
development that reduced carbon 
emissions when compared with fossil 
fuel plants in other parts of the country.  
Under the aegis of the United Nations 
Framework Convention for Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), they insisted that 
the generation of Certified Emissions 
Reduction (CER) would allow to trade 
carbon credits that could be partly used 
to compensate the affected 
communities.  Scant consideration was 
ever given to the possibility that the 
affected communities wished to reject 
any type of compensation arguing that 
sacred lands could not be traded, sold or 
expropriated. 
Despite several efforts to 
produce a win-win game through UN-
mediated dialogue, even when the 
international market for carbon credits 
collapsed, the Ngäbe refusal to assign a 
monetary value to the sacred landscape 
of the Tabasará River rendered the 
green economy environmental discourse 
as bogus preventing the possibility of 
any viable agreement.  An undesirable 
outcome of this failed process was that 
dissenters began to be portrayed as 
irrational actors who did not want to 
negotiate according to logical terms.  
However, who determined the 
boundaries of rationality?  Are spiritual 
values ultimately subject to market 
transactions?  Or are there any limits to 
a purported ideal speech situation 
according to Habermas? 
Had external actors who 
expected to create profit examined the 
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Ngäbe history of continuous struggle 
for land rights they might have soon 
realized that their aspirations went 
beyond a mere contribution to “national 
development” or the generation of 
revenues, an approach that never bore 
fruit for the followers of Omar Torrijos 
in Panamanian politics between 1981-
2009. Located at the heartland of the 
Ngäbe region of Kodriri, the Tabasará 
River had critical importance for local 
livelihoods and at the same time was 
considered a homeland for the peasant 
and Ngäbe communities living along its 
banks.  For the followers of Mama Tata 
in the cultural community of Kiabda, in 
addition, the value of these lands was 
irreplaceable as the site of ancestral 
signs inscribed on petroglyphs from 
which an unique Ngäbe writing and 
reading system was uncovered by their 
elders. 
This article will start with a 
general examination of the Ngäbe land 
struggle since colonial times to present, 
highlighting the emergence of the 
Mama Tata spiritual movement in the 
1960s, years before negotiations started 
between the military government of 
Omar Torrijos and Ngäbe leaders for 
the creation of an autonomous territory 
(comarca indígena).  The historical 
survey will then move through the 
difficult years following the approval of 
the Comarca; and how the issue of 
autonomy dissociated itself from land 
recognition, and delved into 
complicated questions of decision-
making, consultation and customary 
law.  Finally, a detailed description of 
the two logics operating in the Barro 
Blanco controversy will be presented – 
on the one hand, the capitalistic logic of 
UNFCCC market-based climate change 
mitigation; and on the other, the Ngäbe 
defense of a collective territory, 
spirituality and worldview. 
 
The Ngäbe Struggle for 
Land in Historical 
Perspective 
 
Like many other ethnic 
communities in the Americas, for 
centuries the Ngäbe have struggled for 
cultural survival, territorial integrity and 
self-rule.  Today, the Ngobe ethnic 
community numbers above 250,000 
peoples and occupies an extensive 
geographical area between the Western 
provinces of Bocas del Toro, Chiriqui, 
and Veraguas in Panama, as well as a 
number satellite communities in 
Southern Costa Rica.  Although an 
autonomous territory (Comarca 
Indígena Ngobe-Bugle) was created 
through Law 10 of 1997, many 
communities were never included in 
this polygon, and for this reason, the 
Ngäbe as well as the Bugle still 
constitute important minorities in the 
three aforementioned provinces. 
The Ngäbe lands encompass 
significant geographic and ecological 
variations from the high mountains of 
the Tabasará Range, also called 
Cordillera Central, to the dry slopes of 
the Pacific and the lush tropical forests 
of the Caribbean.  The mountains 
constitute the main division between the 
Caribbean region of Ño Kribo, and the 
Pacific regions of Nedrini in the West 
and Kodriri on the East.  Although both 
Pacific regions have less forest 
coverage than the Caribbean, Nedrini 
(formerly part of Chiriquí) is 
characterized by the existence of slopes 
that are more pronounced and a more 
humid climate when compared with the 
extensive dry savannas and undulated 
terrains of Kodriri; where the Barro 
Blanco hydroelectric project is currently 
located. 
Whereas in the Caribbean Ngäbe 
settlements extend into the coastline and 
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the surrounding islands, the coastal 
plains of the Pacific are mostly 
occupied by mestizo peasant dwellers.  
In some regions, especially in Kodriri, 
poor peasants and large landholders 
have lived intermingled with Ngobe 
families for many decades, forming a 
complex of intercultural relations with 
very important political implications for 
land conflicts and political positioning 
(Falla 1979, Sarsanedas 1978). 
During the Spanish colonial 
period, only the writings of priests Fray 
Adrian de Santo Tomas in the 1620s 
and Father Juan Franco in the 1790s 
describe thoroughly the regional culture 
and ethnic interactions of the Ngäbe 
ethnic community with Spanish 
colonists.  Although they reveal subtle 
changes in cosmology and the advance 
of Christianity, in general there appears 
to be continuity in the social life of the 
Ngäbe as a separate ethnic community 
with only limited interaction with 
European imperial domination.  The 
advent of North Atlantic capitalism, 
however, would unleash transcendental 
changes associated with increased trade 
and frequent contacts with both the 
British and the Spanish spheres of 
influence.
2
 
During most of the XIX century, 
Ngäbe interactions with British 
associates in the Caribbean and Spanish 
descendants in the Pacific were 
characterized by the absence of 
powerful actors such as central 
governments, organized churches and 
multinational corporations.  According 
                                                             
2
 Trouillot (2002) provides a critique of the 
concepts of modernity and modernization 
arguing that they constitute “North Atlantic 
Universals” intimately associated with 
“geographies of imagination” and “geographies 
of management”.  For this reason, in this paper 
allusions to modernity should instead be 
interpreted as the advance of North Atlantic 
capitalism associated with national imperial 
projects, especially after the XIX century. 
to British merchant Orlando Roberts 
who lived for a period with the Ngäbe 
in the 1820s, they only had occasional 
contacts with the Spanish and the 
British, mostly for trade (Heckadon-
Moreno 1987). However, by the 1880s, 
a new breed of actors would mold, 
distort and project the image of the 
Ngäbe in Panama and abroad – social 
scientists paving the way for North 
Atlantic investors, colonial powers and 
the banana emporium.
3
 A commercial 
agreement between French investors 
and the Government of the United 
States of Colombia for the construction 
of the Panama Canal facilitated the 
extension of the research work of 
Alphonse Pinart to Lower Central 
America.
4
  After Pinart, many foreign 
social scientists would continue visiting 
the Ngäbe for years to come.
5
 
                                                             
3
  Among the first to visit the region, William 
Moore Gabb (1875) had been contracted by the 
Costa Rican Atlantic Railroad Company to 
examine the potential of the lands in the 
Caribbean for industrial production.  Although 
he spent most of his time in the neighboring 
Talamanca Valley, he also referred to the Ngäbe 
as a group of semi-civilized people who lived 
further south.  
4
  In 1885, Pinart published his fascinating 
narration of his visit to Valle Miranda (or Valle 
del Guaymie).  Sailing from the town of Bocas 
del Toro he entered the Cricamola River in 1883 
to visit the Guaymie or Valiente Indians.  After 
passing the village of Gobrante, he arrived to 
Jocuatabiti in the Valle Miranda.  According to 
Pinart, the Ngobe considered this area their 
territory, and they did not allow any Afro-
descendants or Europeans to live there 
permanently. 
5
  Written before the era of Panamanian 
indigenismo, the work of Henry Pittier deserves 
special attention.  In 1912, Swiss naturalist and 
ethnographer Henry Pittier published an account 
of his visit to the Province of Chiriqui and the 
Ngobe Territory in National Geographic 
Magazine.  In this publication, he calculated the 
number of Guaymi at 5,000, and asserted that 
they had been submitted to the influence of 
missionaries for an extended period of time. 
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Following the creation of the 
Republic of Panama as a separate 
political entity from Colombia, a new 
generation of nation-builders would be 
captivated by the indigenous peoples 
living on the Isthmus past and present, 
and would try to discover the roots of 
Panamanian identity in the cosmic 
mixing of these indigenous ancestors 
with the Spanish Conquistadors.  They 
would construct the intellectual 
foundations of Panamanian indigenismo 
with a series of books that examined the 
indigenous question in the 1920s.  
Unavoidably, these works were imbued 
with the colonialism and scientific 
racism that prevailed during these 
times.
6
  However, they occasionally 
revealed a panorama of how the Ngobe 
were visualized by their mestizo 
neighbors in the Western Pacific, the 
main theater of the future conflict over 
the Tabasará dams including Barro 
Blanco.
7
 
 
Ngäbe Social Change and the 
Rise of the Mama Tata 
 
The work of Young (1971) 
constitutes the most comprehensive 
                                                             
6
  With the exception of Reginald Gordon 
Harris, who actually was Director of the 
Biological Laboratory of the Biological 
Association of Long Island Cold Spring Harbor, 
none of these works truly conducted any 
comprehensive ethnography of indigenous 
groups in Panama. 
7
 The publications of Otto Lutz (1924), Los 
Habitantes Primitivos de la Republica de 
Panama; Reginald Gordon Harris (1926), Los 
Indios de Panama; and Manuel Maria Alba 
(1928), Etnologia y Poblacion Historica de 
Panama, were all dedicated to the patriarch of 
Panamanian education, Octavio Mendez-
Pereira.
7
  As expressed by the Harris dedication: 
“con el sincero deseo de que como exponente de 
la cultura panameña, él aproveche toda 
oportunidad de contribuir a la conservación de 
estos indios que tienen un interés biológico y 
etnográfico tan extraordinario para los hombres 
de nuestros días y para la posteridad” 
study of the Ngabe ethnic community 
until today, and documents the breaking 
point at which changes happened very 
rapidly.  In accordance with his 
theoretical perspective, an impending 
crisis in the Ngäbe natural resource base 
would necessarily result in the 
transformation of traditional patterns of 
social interaction.  In this regard, Young 
(p. 74-81) was the first to warn about 
the depletion of suitable agricultural 
land and the reduction of fallow periods 
in the Pacific, an observation upheld by 
Gjording (1994). 
Young (1971) also commented 
about the trauma produced by the 
replacement of the previous local 
governors by a system of corregidores 
now appointed by non-indigenous 
mayors; and how the new structure that 
was imposed from above had shattered 
the existing patterns of authority, 
privileging literate individuals over 
those who had gained respect in the 
communities through traditional means 
(p. 202-212).   
According to Priestley (1986), 
the 1960s brought an unprecedented 
wave of popular mobilization in 
Panama, precisely the times when 
Young was conducting his research.  
The Liberal welfare state that had 
managed and attenuated radical 
manifestations of nationalism as well as 
revolutionary ideals in the 1950s had 
succeeded in maintaining electoral 
democracy and ensuring economic 
growth; yet the country had also 
become strained by inequality, 
capitalization, and rampant political 
corruption.  In rural Panama, land 
conflicts increased in spite of the efforts 
of the Catholic Church to promote 
limited land reform.
8
 
                                                             
8
 In the 1960s, the Catholic Church of Panama 
launched Plan Veraguas in response to growing 
tensions and disparities in the rural countryside. 
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In the midst of all these tensions, 
the Ngäbe boundary with 
nonindigenous peasant communities 
constituted a particularly contested 
region as mixed-blood farmers 
encroached upon the Ngäbe Territory as 
a result of land accumulation and 
speculation by larger landowners to 
produce beef and other agricultural 
market products.  Both Sarsanedas 
(1978) and Herrera (1989) agree that the 
construction of the Pan-American 
Highway between Santiago (Veraguas) 
and David (Chiriqui) accelerated the 
dispossession of Ngäbe lands.  In the 
same lines, both Sarsanedas (1978 p. 
46) and Guionneau-Sinclair (1988 p. 
179-183) document movements 
organized by Ngäbe leaders in Nedrini 
to demand respect for their land rights.  
Camilo Ortega (personal 
communication) mentioned similar 
mobilizations in Kodriri, and Jose Cruz 
Monico r. i. p. (personal 
communication) also referred to these 
kinds of movements in the Pacific. 
These grassroots mobilizations 
enhanced the capacity of the Ngäbe to 
express their aspirations in national 
society and created conditions for new 
forms of political organization in years 
to come. Yet, the most important 
political transformations in Ngäbe 
society were associated with the 
spiritual revival leading to the Mama 
Tata insurrection of 1965.  According to 
both Sarsanedas (1978 p. 25-26) and 
Guionneau-Sinclair (1988), the first 
apparition of the Mother Mary (Mama-
Kri)
9
 happened to Delia Sanjur in Sitio 
Prado in 1956.  This was then followed 
by the apparition of Potrero de Caña 
(1959) to Cándida Jiménez; Tijera 
(1960) to Rufina and Ifigenia Flores; 
                                                             
9
  In Ngäbere, Mama-Kri means the Great 
Mother as opposed to Mama-Chi or the Little 
Mother as the prophet Delia Bejarano herself 
came to be known. 
and finally the great apparition of Soloy 
(1962) to Delia Bejarano (who came to 
be known as Mama-Chi).  During this 
apparition, according to Mama-Chi, 
both Jesus and Mary asked the Ngäbe to 
separate themselves from the corruption 
of non-indigenous society, especially 
public education and trade with 
mestizos in the neighboring coastal 
towns.  At the same time, the new 
spirituality called for abolition of 
centuries-long rituals such as krün (or 
balsería in Spanish) and the rites of 
passage.  To sustain these social 
changes, Mama Tata leaders created 
their own schools where “students” 
would be educated by their elders in the 
new spirituality and Ngäbe worldview.  
This spiritual movement spread rapidly 
throughout the Ngäbe Territory 
upholding claims for an autonomous 
indigenous jurisdiction, in Panama 
commonly known as a comarca 
indígena. 
With the rise of Mama Tata, the 
years between 1962-1964 represented 
the main rupture of the Ngäbe with 
fundamental social institutions that had 
sustained Ngäbe society since the times 
of Fray Adrian de Santo Tomas.  After 
the expressed prohibition of Mama 
Tata, the balseria ceased to exist as the 
most important occasion for trans-
kinship social interactions among the 
Ngäbe.
10
  In this ancient ritual, two 
Ngäbe kin groups came together at a 
site where ritual stick fights would 
happen in pairs for several days 
involving relations of 
friendship/competition between the two 
kin groups.  That was also an important 
                                                             
10
  Young (1976) himself provided the first 
academic interpretation of the ancient rite of 
krün or balseria.  For him the ceremony might 
be the remnant of previous Pre-Columbian ritual 
competitions among chiefs.  For the Ngäbe, 
krün represented cooperation and competition 
among rivals, a persistent topic in the Ngäbe 
worldview. 
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occasion for celebration, trade and even 
establishment of trans-kinship personal 
ties including the possibility of new 
marriages.  Until today Mama Tata 
leaders argue that balseria brought 
violence and division, and not Ngäbe 
unity.  According to Young (1971), 
beginning in 1962 the Mama Tata 
meetings replaced the balserias as the 
main occasions of trans-kinship 
relations among the Ngäbe. 
Mama Tata was simultaneously 
a movement for Ngäbe concerted action 
despite any kinship differences; 
separation from external control; and 
internal social reform by replacing 
ancient rites and advocating for new 
forms of schooling and territorial 
protection.  However, and 
unexpectedly, Mama Chi died in 1964 
(possibly from disease) suddenly 
dividing the movement between 
traditional leaders (sukias) and younger 
people referred as “students” who 
preferred more overt forms of political 
action.  The separatist movement rising 
from the Mama-Chi revelation 
eventually became explicit when the 
“students” declared an independent 
republic in 1965.   
In the context of popular 
mobilization gaining steam in Panama 
during the 1960s, the prevailing 
response of the Liberal oligarchic 
governments was outright repression 
through the increasingly powerful 
National Guard.
11
  For this reason, it 
should not be deemed surprising when a 
mid-career officer and regional head of 
                                                             
11
 According to Pearcy (1998), the National 
Guard had become the main arbiter of 
Panamanian politics after the 1947 riots against 
the renewal of a lease for American bases in the 
country.  Undeniably, this military/police 
institution had been demonstrating autonomy 
from the civilian oligarchy and represented a 
main avenue for social mobility among 
Panamanian poor families (Guevara Mann 
1996, Ropp 1982). 
the National Guard in the province of 
Chiriquí, Omar Torrijos Herrera, was 
dispatched to the Ngäbe communities to 
suffocate the insurrection.  According to 
several accounts of the episode 
including that of Guionneau-Sinclair 
(1988), Torrijos Herrera preferred 
dialogue to repression and dissuaded the 
“students” from continuing with the 
independence declaration.
12
  What 
exactly happened with the Mama Tata 
movement after the uprising has never 
been entirely clear.  According to 
Guionneau-Sinclair (1988), the sukias 
continued with the movement away 
from the public eye, and possibly at 
special cultural places such as those to 
be flooded by the Barro Blanco 
reservoir fifty years later. 
 
Military Indigenismo, National 
Development and the Tabasará 
Dams 
 
After mid-career officers of the 
National Guard gave a coup to seize 
control of the Panamanian government 
in 1968, the episode of the Mama Tata 
rebellion in the Ngäbe Territory came to 
symbolize the Torrijos proposal for a 
new kind of relation between the State 
and indigenous peoples.  Although the 
government indeed had the armed 
capacity to crush the indigenous 
mobilization in 1965, the personal 
approach of Omar Torrijos Herrera had 
apparently opted for dialogue, 
bargaining and cooptation to bring 
indigenous peoples under the wing of 
the State. 
                                                             
12
  Sarsanedas (1978) and Gjording (1994) 
emphasized the special relation between 
General Omar Torrijos and the main leader of 
the Mama Tata movement, Samuel Gonzalez, in 
the 1970s.  Sarsanedas even pointed out that this 
caused problems for cacique Lorenzo Rodriguez 
from Nedrini who felt disrespected by the 
preference of the General for the spiritual 
leader. 
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In spite of this so-called special 
relation, the alliance between 
indigenous peoples and the military 
government effectively demobilized the 
grassroots activism that was pressuring 
the government for land recognition in 
the 1960s; and gave a fatal blow to a 
vibrant and independent indigenous 
movement that already existed at the 
national level.  In a congress held in 
Alto de Jesús in 1969, the Ngäbe 
officially adopted a system of three 
regional caciques for Kodriri, Nedrini 
and Ño Kribo building upon the pan-
Ngäbe tendencies that were catalyzed 
by Mama Tata.  The possibility of 
coalescing into a general congress 
similar to the Kuna Onmeked always 
remained a challenge for Ngäbe 
political organization that would be 
faced by younger members of this 
ethnic community in the 1970s with 
expectations, visions and aspirations 
less traditional than those of the original 
three regional caciques.  When the first 
Ngäbe-Bugle General Congress was 
celebrated in Cankintu in 1978, General 
Torrijos himself attended this gathering 
and reiterated his promise to create an 
autonomous territory, the Comarca 
Indígena Ngobe-Bugle. 
Besides any sympathy towards 
the Ngäbe, the General surely was 
preoccupied with another issue of 
national importance – the development 
of the Cerro Colorado Mining Project.  
According to Gjording (1994), Cerro 
Colorado represented one of the largest 
copper deposits in the world; and a 
considerable amount of energy would 
be required for the operation of the 
mining complex.  In this scheme, the 
construction of two large dams on the 
Tabasará River was regarded as a 
complement to mine operations; and 
such level of intervention on the 
landscape, required acceptance from the 
Ngäbe people.  Instead of forceful 
relocation, according to Herrera (1989), 
Torrijos expected the Ngäbe to give 
their share for national development 
once their autonomous territory was 
legally recognized.  A different 
narrative from peasants and indigenous 
peoples from Tabasará depicted General 
Torrijos talking personally with the 
people who were opposed to the dams, 
putting his hat on the table, and 
promising that those dams would never 
be built against the will of the people 
(Jordan 2010b). 
After the unexpected death of 
Torrijos in 1981, and as government 
bureaucrats pressed for the construction 
of the Cerro Colorado Mine for the sake 
of national development, the Ngäbe 
instead organized a grassroots 
mobilization that would take their 
demands to the doorsteps of national 
authorities.  In 1983, the first Ngobe-
Bugle March for the Creation of a 
Comarca Indígena arrived into Panama 
City only to encounter a bureaucracy 
that had changed its tone, its approach 
and its style towards indigenous 
peoples.  The tensions that were 
inherent in the right turn of the military 
“revolutionary” regime remained 
hidden beneath the surface until the 
tragic airplane accident that took the life 
of General Torrijos Herrera.  His 
disappearance ended a military regime 
that sustained an indigenista policy of 
cooptation, integration and 
acculturation. 
 
Political Crisis, Economic 
Reform, and the Creation of the 
Comarca 
 
The Ngäbe negotiations 
collapsed in 1983 after unresolvable 
disagreements on the continuation of 
the Cerro Colarado Mine and the 
boundaries of the Comarca in the 
Province of Veraguas (Herrera 1989 p. 
113-115).  The failure of the 
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negotiations coincided with a period of 
increasing turmoil in Panama, as the 
country approached the first direct 
presidential elections since 1968.  
General Manuel Antonio Noriega had 
defeated his main political opponents 
within the military, and was preparing 
to seize control of the government in 
favor of his candidate, former head of 
the World Bank for Latin America, 
Nicolas Ardito Barletta (Lafeber 1989 
p. 194-197).  This unleashed a political 
crisis that withheld any major political 
and economic reforms in Panama 
during the 1980s, delayed the creation 
of any new comarcas, and led to the 
tragic invasion of the country by the 
United States in 1989. 
The phantom of structural 
adjustment resurfaced soon after the US 
Marines began leaving a war-torn and 
devastated Panama in 1990.  As former 
Torrijos supporters battled against the 
economic reform package of the first 
Minister of Economic Planning of the 
new democratic period, Guillermo Ford; 
indigenous peoples resumed their 
political mobilizations and reunified 
their leadership (Camilo Ortega 
personal communication) once again 
demanding the legal recognition of their 
territorial rights.
13
 Paradoxically, and 
reminiscent of similar developments in 
Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico in 
the 1980s and 1990s; the party of the 
Torrijos Revolution, the Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (PRD) inherited the 
mission to implement structural 
adjustment, and so it did with 
unexpected fervor.  Despite the lack of a 
                                                             
13
  The Ngäbe-Bugle General Congress was 
divided by the intervention of General Noriega 
in Ngäbe internal elections in the late 1980s. 
The General Congress was unified in 1989 with 
the election of Celestino Gallardo in Cerro 
Iglesias (Nedrini) only months before the US 
invasion.  In 1992, Isidro Acosta replaced 
Gallardo in Alto de Jesus (Kodriri) (Bernardo 
Jimenez personal communication). 
full-blown constitutional process, we 
can interpret the election of Ernesto 
Pérez Balladares (1994-1999) as the 
start date of a neoliberal citizen regime 
in Panama following Yashar (2005) and 
Van Cott (2005). 
According to Hale (2002), these 
changes in citizen regimes could not be 
dissociated from a new form of state 
control over indigenous peoples that 
went beyond classical indigenismo - 
neoliberal multiculturalism.  According 
to this perspective, governments would 
enact select legal reforms and 
implement multicultural provisions to 
quell stronger demands for social and 
economic changes, differentiating those 
indigenous peoples who were willing to 
settle for these limited changes with 
those who maintained their original 
demands.  Restart of negotiations with 
the Ngäbe over the Comarca signaled 
the State desire to adopt multicultural 
provisions that would facilitate 
neoliberal governance. 
In 1995, the Government 
presented a new proposal that reduced 
the limits of the Comarca even beyond 
the controversial bill that had been 
rejected in 1986 (Bernardo Jimenez 
personal communication).  However, as 
an even younger generation assumed 
the Ngäbe leadership, a negotiating 
commission was created to try to reach 
an agreement with the Government.  
This commission was formed by Julio 
Dixon, Ausencio Palacio, Hermelindo 
Ortega (son of Camilo Ortega), Jose 
Ellington, Antonino Acosta and Alberto 
Montezuma.  For these younger leaders, 
the approval of the comarca bill could 
not be delayed any longer and therefore 
an understanding had to be reached both 
with the Government and with the non-
indigenous peasants (campesinos) and 
land-owners (terratenientes) who had 
been lobbying against the Comarca bill 
for almost twenty years (Ausencio 
Palacio personal communication). 
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During the final push for the 
creation of the Comarca, grassroots 
mobilization became a most decisive 
factor.  In 1996, Ngäbe student 
Saturnino Aguirre was assassinated 
under very suspicious circumstances in 
the town of San Felix where a new 
company Panacobre, S. A. was trying to 
bring back the Cerro Colorado Mine 
(Bernardo Jimenez personal 
communication).
14
  In response, the 
Ngäbe organized a second march to 
Panama City only three weeks after the 
assassination.  This second march 
departed from Sitio Prado (Kodriri) and 
was much larger than the 1983 
mobilization.  The elder caciques Jose 
Cruz Monico and Camilo Ortega 
participated in the march as well as 
younger Ngäbe prospective leaders such 
as Pedro Abrego and Bernardo Jimenez.  
The march did not only become a strong 
statement to the National Government, 
but also an internal sign of Ngäbe unity 
and mobilization capacity.  On March 7, 
1997, PRD President Ernesto Perez 
Balladares finally signed Law 10 that 
created the Ngobe-Bugle Comarca. 
An in-depth analysis would be 
necessary to understand the reasons the 
architect of neoliberal economic reform 
in Panama, President Perez Balladares, 
finally passed the Comarca law.  
Although the Pérez Balladares (1994-
1999) presidential administration 
delivered the promises of Torrijos 
Herrera for the creation of a Comarca, it 
was also responsible for enacting 
economic reform in line with the 
Washington Consensus, including the 
sale of national public utilities.  The 
                                                             
14
  According to Bernardo Jimenez, this crime 
has never been properly clarified.  The 
assassination of Saturnino Aguirre occurred 
twenty six years after the death of Elias Claras 
also under unclear circumstances in Cerro 
Pelado (Kodriri).  For the Ngäbe both Claras 
and Aguirre are considered martyrs of the 
struggle for the creation of the Comarca. 
development of hydroelectric 
infrastructure throughout the country, 
under a new modality of private 
investment, represented an imminent 
threat to the integrity of indigenous 
territories and to the worldview of 
indigenous peoples.  The course of 
collusion of the 1970s had then become 
the road to collision in the 1990s.  The 
future of the Ngäbe ethnic community 
would now depend on the unavoidable 
confrontation between the capitalist 
logic of the new Liberal State, searching 
for business opportunities in every 
transaction including climate change 
mitigation; and the resistance of 
indigenous communities in places such 
as the cultural community of Kiabda 
along the Tabasará River. 
 
The Protracted Conflict over 
the Tabasará Hydroelectric 
Dams 
 
The creation of the Ngobe-Bugle 
Comarca through Law 10 of 1997 was 
regarded as the culmination of a forty-
year Ngäbe struggle for land rights and 
self-determination.  The triumphalism 
of the signing ceremony, however, 
concealed profound rifts within the 
Ngäbe leadership, divisions that had 
been accentuated by the negotiation 
process, and that would affect the 
capacity of the Ngäbe to fight decisively 
against large development project such 
as Barro Blanco.
15
  As mentioned 
                                                             
15
 In addition to regional rivalries, the Ngäbe 
were deeply divided on fundamental questions 
such as loyalty to different political parties, 
religious affiliation, approval of development 
projects, and the extent that community justice 
should be implemented.  In general, they had 
not reached a consensus on what position to 
adopt in front of an assertive State that promised 
“development” (or rather public infrastructure) 
if tourism, hydroelectric and mining projects 
were uncritically accepted in the Ngäbe 
Territory. 
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above, economic reforms enacted by 
President Pérez Balladares (1994-1999) 
allowed for private investors to 
undertake development projects at the 
national level.  Following the 
privatization of the national electricity 
institute - Instituto de Recursos 
Hidráulicos y Electrificación (IRHE), a 
number of concessions and licenses for 
the generation of electricity were 
granted to national and foreign firms to 
build around the country, among them 
to Consorcio Tabasará, S. A., for the 
construction of two dams on the 
Tabasará River (Tabasará I and 
Tabasará II). 
The original Tabasará dams 
were conceived as part of the ambitious 
scheme to power the Cerro Colorado 
Mining Project (Gjording 1994).  As 
explained above, when these dams were 
proposed by the military government in 
the 1970s, there was widespread 
opposition to this initiative among the 
Ngäbe and poor mixed-blood peasants 
(campesinos) in the Province of 
Chiriquï.  According to Dionisio 
Rodriguez (personal communication), 
Omar Torrijos Herrera himself heard 
the complaints of the Chiriquï peasants 
and Ngäbe indigenous peoples.  After a 
long conversation, the General put his 
hat on the table and declared that they 
should not worry, that these projects 
would never be built.  As with many 
other Torrijos promises, his personal 
commitment to respect the local 
opposition to the dams had fallen into 
oblivion years after his death.  In the 
late 1990s, a group of local investors 
associated with prominent PRD figures 
had decided to harvest the power of the 
Tabasará waters.  The first of the dams, 
Tabasará I, would affect the Ngobe-
Bugle annexed area of the 
Corregimiento of Bakama, District of 
Muná in the Region of Kodriri where 
the cultural community of Kiabda was 
located; while Tabasará II was planned 
to be constructed downstream in lands 
owned by poor nonindigenous peasants. 
When the descendants of the 
same peasant and indigenous leaders 
that had talked to Torrijos suddenly 
realized the imminence of the Tabasarä 
dams during the early months of the 
Mireya Moscoso administration (1999-
2004), they began to mobilize to 
express their outright opposition to 
these projects (Berediana Rodriguez and 
Adelaida Miranda personal 
communication).  For this purpose, they 
reached for the assistance of two 
government institutions that had been 
established by the Pérez Balladares 
administration to protect citizen rights 
and to guarantee fair competition in 
Panama after the neoliberal economic 
reform – the National Environmental 
Authority (ANAM), and the Office of 
the Ombudsman.  Unfortunately, during 
the public hearings that were required as 
part of the consultation process for the 
approval of the Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs), ANAM presided 
over what became a mockery of citizen 
participation.  Consorcio Tabasará 
simply used public relations techniques 
to sell the benefits of the projects to the 
impoverished peasants and indigenous 
peoples, including unwarranted 
promises of employment.  The 
Company even tried to utilize the 
wealthy landowners (latifundistas) to 
gain the support of the local authorities 
and to quell the opposition of the poor 
sectors of the population. 
Faced with the lack of 
receptivity of the National 
Environmental Authority (ANAM), the 
peasants and indigenous peoples, now 
coalesced into the April 10 Movement 
(M-10) for the Defense of the Tabasará 
River, appealed to the National 
Ombudsman, Italo Antinori - who 
happened to be from the region 
impacted by the projects (Berediana 
Rodriguez and Adelaida Miranda 
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personal communication). Thanks to 
these inquiries, on June 6, 2000, the 
communities organized a general 
assembly with the Ombudsman and the 
Indigenous Affairs Committee of the 
National Assembly in the area affected 
by the Tabasará I hydroelectric project.  
As the local population expressed its 
grievances against the projects, the 
government officials began arguing 
among themselves and the meeting 
finished in the midst of discord and 
confusion. 
During the coming months, and 
with the assistance of the Ombudsman 
Office, the people affected by the 
Tabasará projects began filing 
complaints against ANAM concerning 
the approval of the Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) (Berediana 
Rodriguez personal communication).
16
  
Although the peasants and indigenous 
leaders did not have money to pay for 
legal action, a private lawyer, Jacinto 
Cárdenas, presented a lawsuit against 
the ANAM environmental impact 
resolution IA-048-2000 that approved 
the construction of the Tabasará II 
hydroelectric project.
17
  Based on this 
lawsuit, the Supreme Court ordered the 
temporary suspension of the 
hydroelectric project in December 2000, 
arguing that the national government 
                                                             
16
  The General Administrator of ANAM, 
Ricardo Anguizola, also a native of Chiriquí 
Province, even attended a second general 
assembly with the affected communities 
convened for the month of July.  As part of their 
campaign to voice their opposition to the 
projects, the peasants and indigenous leaders 
began organizing demonstrations to block the 
Pan-American Highway.  Although these 
demonstrations were violently repressed by the 
Police and extracted a heavy toll from the 
protestors, the blockades served to attract the 
attention of the national media, and to put 
pressure on the government authorities to look 
for a peaceful resolution of this conflict. 
17
  Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de 
Nulidad interpuesta por el Lic. Jacinto Cárdenas 
(Expediente 665-00). 
had violated the General Environmental 
(Law 41 of 1998) whose articles 96-105 
called for the consultation of indigenous 
authorities before the start of any 
development projects affecting their 
territories.  The legal victory of 
Tabasará II was interpreted as a major 
step forward in the protection of 
indigenous rights in Panama. 
Although the Supreme Court had 
ruled for the temporary suspension of 
Tabasará II based on the lack of 
consultation with the affected Ngäbe 
population, the unexpected success of 
the grassroots mobilization of the M-10 
generated decisive reactions from a 
Panamanian State that by that time was 
straying away from any alliance with 
indigenous peoples and popular 
organizations.  In 2002, lawyer Jacinto 
Cárdenas desisted on the Tabasará 
lawsuit to avoid a conflict of interest 
after being nominated as deputy justice 
for the Supreme Court.  As a result, 
Consorcio Tabasará began considering 
to start with the construction of the 
Tabasará dams (La Prensa, January 4, 
2003). 
In reaction to these events, on 
January 25, 2003, peasants and 
indigenous peoples blocked the Pan-
American Highway demanding a 
meeting with President Mireya Moscoso 
herself (La Critica, January 26, 2003; El 
Siglo, January 26, 2003).  The protest 
turned violent after the Governor of 
Chiriqui, Miguel Fanovich, came to the 
area instead of the President.  Clashes 
with the Police led to the arrest of fifty-
six people including women and 
children.  Although seventeen of the 
protesters were accused of public 
disorder, these charges were later 
dropped after pressure from the 
Indigenous Affairs Committee of the 
National Assembly (La Prensa, January 
28, 2003; La Critica, January 29, 2003). 
Soon after the January 2003 
demonstrations, the investors decided to 
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halt the Tabasará hydroelectric projects, 
and from that moment on, the Tabasará 
movement remained a reference point 
for national grassroots organizations 
struggling for the protection of their 
individual and collective rights from the 
abuses of the government and private 
investors.  In spite of the apparent 
success of the Tabasará movement, over 
the next few months, the Moscoso 
administration began debilitating the 
multicultural provisions of the 
neoliberal citizenship regime 
consolidated during the Perez 
Balladares administration (1994-1999). 
Most importantly, in 2003, the 
whole chapter of the General 
Environmental Law that called for the 
consultation of indigenous peoples was 
eliminated, and important modifications 
were also approved for Law 10 of 1997.  
In June 2004, the National Assembly 
also rejected the proposed law that 
created another comarca for the Naso 
indigenous people.  Government 
officials realized that the development 
of mining, and hydroelectric projects 
could not be advanced without 
impediment when they also had to 
protect indigenous rights in the midst of 
neoliberal modernization.  As private 
companies and government bureaucrats 
realized that indigenous peoples would 
not necessarily embrace neoliberal 
modernization, that limited 
multicultural rights would not be 
sufficient to manage demands for self-
determination, the State adopted an 
unsympathetic position towards 
indigenous claims. 
 
 
Greening the Tabasará Dams: 
The Barro Blanco Hydroelectric 
Project 
 
When the son of Omar Torrijos 
Herrera, Martín Torrijos Espino (2004-
2009), assumed the presidency of 
Panama, the Ngäbe were passing 
through a complicated situation facing 
the imminent advance of mining and 
hydroelectric projects in their 
autonomous territory.  Despite the 
creation of the Comarca, government 
agencies were reluctant to accept the 
possibility that the Ngäbe make 
decisions that were contrary to 
government plans.  Under this context, 
the Tenth Ngobe-Bugle General 
Congress in Kuerima (Nedrini) in 2006 
would be determinant for the viability 
of the Comarca nine years after the 
approval of Law 10.  For the Kuerima 
Congress, the new PRD presidential 
administration of Torrijos Espino 
mobilized all of its political apparatus to 
defeat the incumbent Pedro Rodriguez, 
a predicador of Mama Tata, who had 
unexpectedly inherited the position 
from Victor Guerra after he had 
resigned to run for corregimiento 
representative in 2004.  Government 
vehicles were transporting congress 
participants from the farthest reaches of 
the Ngäbe Territory, providing food, 
shelter, and logistical assistance for this 
massive event.   
Unfortunately, for the 
government party, the results were not 
as expected.  In a sudden turn of events, 
some of the supporters of the other 
candidates, including PRD supporters, 
coalesced behind incumbent Pedro 
Rodriguez who campaigned on three 
basic planks – no mines, no 
hydroelectric dams, and the installation 
of control posts in the access roads to 
the Ngobe-Bugle Comarca.
18
  The next 
                                                             
18
  According to La Prensa, March 18, 2005, a 
mandatory fee of US$ 0.50 per vehicle had been 
implemented in the road to Quebrada Guabo in 
Nedrini.  This measure was supported by both 
the regional cacique, Rogelio Moreno, and the 
local legislator, Patricio Montezuma.  Albeit 
controversial for outsiders, there is an unusual 
consensus among different authorities in the 
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course of events made a complete 
mockery of the PRD.  All support was 
withdrawn from the General Congress, 
including the use of government 
equipment like the main electrical plant.  
Transportation was offered to congress 
participants to desert the meeting that 
was actually expected to extend for 
three additional days.  As the number of 
congress participants sharply dropped 
and living conditions worsened literally 
from one day to the other; opposition 
politicians stepped in to take advantage 
of the PRD debacle, most importantly 
the leader of the new Democratic 
Change (CD) party, Ricardo Martinelli, 
soon to become president of Panama 
(2009-2014).  Mr. Martinelli replaced 
President Torrijos Espino as the 
messianic provider to the General 
Congress with his surprise visit on 
Friday March 10, 2006.
19
 
In 2006, the Torrijos Espino 
administration also allowed the 
cancellation of the Tabasará I 
concession and its replacement with a 
new concession under the name of 
Barro Blanco.  The new concession 
awarded to a company of Honduran 
capital, GENISA. This new version of 
the hydroelectric plant affecting the 
Ngobe-Bugle Comarca did not only 
differentiate from Tabasara I for having 
a lower generation capacity, and 
                                                                                  
Comarca in favor of these control posts (La 
Prensa, December 27, 2006). 
19
  A few weeks later, in April 2006, Ricardo 
Martinelli accused the PRD government of 
leaving the Ngobe-Bugle General Congress 
without any food and transportation during the 
annual conference of the Asociacion Panameña 
de Ejecutivos de Empresas (APEDE).  This 
2006 Annual Conference of Business 
Executives (CADE 2006) focused on the role of 
political parties in the promotion of democracy, 
and featured prominent representatives of all the 
officially registered political parties in the 
country.  Ricardo Martinelli ran against PRD 
Balbina Herrera in the 2009 general elections, 
and became the President of Panama on July 1, 
2009. 
therefore a smaller reservoir; but also 
because of the new discourse that 
supported its convenience, profitability 
and environmental sustainability.  As 
opposed to the Tabasara I and II dams 
Barro Blanco was portrayed as an 
unrivalled opportunity to decrease 
carbon emissions mitigating climate 
change, a new kind of justification for 
power dams around the world.
20
 
In 1997, the Conference of the 
Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) had created the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Among its main 
provisions, a new carbon offset scheme 
was devised to operate under the 
direction and supervision of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  The 
CDM allowed more developed, higher-
polluting countries (Annex I) to buy 
Certified Emissions Reduction (CERs) 
from less developed, lower-polluting 
countries (Non-Annex I).  Allegedly, 
lower-polluting countries like Panama 
would then have the capacity to use 
these revenues to compensate private 
companies like GENISA that were 
supposedly engaging in climate change 
mitigation and sustainable development.  
The creation of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), and specifically the 
inclusion of power dams as eligible 
projects, deeply divided environmental 
organizations between those who 
regarded this new market mechanism as 
an opportunity for doing business with 
the private sector, and those who 
considered carbon trading as a form of 
false solution to climate change. 
The ANAM administration 
between 2004-2009 had 
                                                             
20
 http://www.aida-americas.org/our-
work/climate-change/dam-no-more-truth-about-
large-dams 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/blogs/246/la
rge-scale-power-projects-undermine-the-cdm 
http://unfccc.int/cop8/se/kiosk/cm2.pdf 
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disproportionate expectations about the 
potential of Panama to obtain revenues 
from carbon trading, saying at some 
point that the country could become “a 
world leader in climate change 
mitigation”.21 This unexpected 
turnaround originated from the 
participation of key ANAM officials in 
the promotion of "green business" 
related to the implementation of the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC); in 
particular, the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The use of the CDM scheme 
to justify the progress of the Barro 
Blanco hydroelectric plant and other 
power dams around the country was 
intended to give greater legitimacy to a 
battered industry that had been severely 
criticized around the world; and that 
was now presented as an opportunity to 
uphold the implementation of best 
practices and mitigate climate change.
22
 
Based on these considerations, ANAM 
accelerated the approval of the Barro 
Blanco environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) in 2008 without 
taking into consideration the strong 
opposition against the dams in the 
                                                             
21
 The head of ANAM, Ligia Castro, and her 
deputy administrator, Eduardo Reyes, were very 
active in the fight against climate change and 
the promotion of carbon trading, making this 
international policy a cornerstone of their work 
at ANAM between 2004-2009. 
https://impresa.prensa.com/economia/Panama-
centro-regional-carbono_0_1616088557.html 
https://impresa.prensa.com/mundo/Creditos-
carbono-causan-
incertidumbre_0_1405359526.html 
https://www.caf.com/media/3144/Sinergia22.pd
f 
22
  In 2000, the World Commission on Dams 
(WCD) had issued a very critical assessment 
about the social and environmental impacts of 
these infrastructures around the world. 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/t
he-world-commission-on-dams 
Ngäbe communities of the District of 
Munä, Kodriri region, Comarca Ngobe-
Bugle.  ANAM officials were so 
convinced that carbon credits would 
better the fate of the indigenous 
communities that they even included a 
clause in the EIA approval resolution 
promising to share revenues from 
carbon trading with the affected 
communities. The sons and daughters of 
the same peasants and indigenous 
peoples who believed the promise of 
Omar Torrijos Herrera watched in 
disbelief how his descendants pushed 
for the damming of the Tabasará against 
their widespread rejection of any dams 
on this River that was captured in the 
phrase “Tabasará Libre”. 
Once secured the approval for 
the EIA, GENISA moved forward in 
validating the Barro Blanco 
hydroelectric project as eligible for the 
CDM.
23
  According to UNFCCC rules, 
this procedure had to be completed by a 
third party; in this case, Spanish firm 
AENOR located in Barcelona.  The 
validation process included a public 
consultation period in which 
stakeholders could send comments 
about the Project Design Document 
(PDD), a highly technical document that 
was available online, and only in 
English.
24
  Understandably, in 2008 this 
procedure was strange for the affected 
communities who never sent comments, 
and possibly did not even notice the 
validation process.  A year later, a 
second validation process was initiated 
by AENOR after the promoting 
company GENISA had decided to 
increase the generating capacity of the 
dam to 28.84 MW. 
                                                             
23
 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/AENOR126
1468057.59/view 
24
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/B/O/L/BOL
WGNA7FS4YKM23JCHPQ695ZIU8ET/Barro
%20Blanco%20PDD%20v3.08?t=UWl8cDgze
m90fDBXqV9v8I6Y_sgSeOz4SR_E 
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While all these transactions 
happened in the UNFCCC web site, the 
affected peasant and Ngäbe 
communities continued their opposition 
to Barro Blanco far removed from 
decision-maker centers in different 
European cities.  An unexpected 
approximation happened when officials 
from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) contacted interested stakeholders 
in Panama in June 2009 to assess the 
possibility of financing the 
hydroelectric project.  Confronted with 
strong arguments about lack of 
consultation as well as environmental 
harm, bank officials replied that the 
Project was preferable to electricity 
generation with fossil fuels, and 
therefore served the higher purpose of 
mitigating climate change. 
As the 2009 electoral campaign 
neared, the prospects for indigenous 
autonomy in Panama were not 
optimistic.
25
 The morale of the PRD 
collapsed when the Democratic Change 
(CD) candidate Ricardo Martinelli 
obtained 60% of the national vote for 
the presidential seat in alliance with 
Juan Carlos Varela of the Panameñista 
Party.  As the new presidential 
administration was inaugurated, the role 
of the state was expected to downsize 
and move further ahead along the 
neoliberal pathway.  In spite of his 
neopopulist rhetoric, Martinelli (2009-
                                                             
25
  That same year Naso and Ngäbe leaders from 
Bocas del Toro filed a petition to the World 
Bank Inspection Panel against the National 
Program for Land Administration (PRONAT) 
jointly financed by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).  
Although the main purpose of that program was 
to promote private land titling, the World Bank 
had included a component for the delimitation 
of protected areas and indigenous territories.  
The indigenous leaders argued that PRONAT 
had failed to recognize their land rights.  This 
request responded to the World Bank‟s 
indigenous policy following the structural 
changes discussed by Fox and Brown (1998). 
2014) had made it clear that he would 
strive to create new incentives for 
private investment, including an 
unapologetic push for mining and a new 
law for private land titling in coastal 
areas.  When a third march to Panama 
City was organized by the Ngäbe 
leadership in September 2009, President 
Martinelli refused to meet with the 
protestors, and instead delegated this 
responsibility to the new Director of 
Indigenista Affairs, Jose Isaac Acosta, a 
former M10 activist and CD candidate 
for the Kodriri seat in national congress. 
 
Continued Conflict and the 
Collapse of the Democratic 
Change 
 
The first major clash between 
the Ngäbe indigenous people and the 
Martinelli government happened in July 
2010 after protests erupted throughout 
the country against a new bill that 
weakened a number of environmental, 
labor and human rights regulations.  
Since all of these changes were grouped 
together into a single bill, they were 
aptly referred as Ley Chorizo, or 
Sausage Law.  The protests against this 
bill left a heavy toll on human lives and 
injuries, most importantly in the town of 
Changuinola in the Province of Bocas 
del Toro, where the armed forces 
clashed for days against demonstrators 
from SITRAIBANA, the banana 
workers union.  For the casual observer, 
this seemed to be a classical conflict 
between the State and labor unions; yet 
SITRAIBANA members happened to 
be majority Ngäbe, and they were 
heavily repressed based on their ethnic 
identity as documented in a special 
report by the National Human Rights 
Network (Red Nacional de Derechos 
Humanos). 
Confronted with the unexpected 
strength of this grassroots reaction, the 
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Martinelli government was pressed to 
repel the bill and start a dialogue table 
mediated by former head of the UN 
system in Panama, Isabel de Saint Malo.  
Later in the same year, the Government 
presented another highly controversial 
bill that modified the Mining Code to 
facilitate the construction of the Cerro 
Colorado Mine.  Once again, the Ngäbe 
leadership reacted very strongly against 
this government initiative coalescing 
into the Coordinadora Ngäbe para la 
Defensa de los Recursos Naturales 
(hereafter referred as the Coordinadora) 
that organized mobilizations and 
roadblocks on the Pan-American 
Highway in early 2011. 
Once again, the Martinelli 
administration exceeded itself in the use 
of power as was documented by the 
National Human Rights Nework; and 
then later stepped back to start a new 
negotiation process.  There appeared to 
be a Janus-faced government that 
pushed for neoliberal reform and 
privatization without consultation, and 
then backed up for dialogue 
extemporaneously.  Public figures in the 
governing coalition seemed to be 
equally divided between hard-liners and 
negotiators; and the Panameñista Party 
of Vice-President Juan Carlos Varela 
assumed most of the political cost of 
negotiation.
26
 
After the massive 2011 
mobilization, an agreement was reached 
between the Government and the 
                                                             
26
 In late 2008 Juan Carlos Varela from the 
Panameñista Party was actually expected to run 
against Ricardo Martinelli of the Democratic 
Change (CD).  Months later, they forged an 
alliance to run together against PRD candidate, 
Balbina Herrera, who was accused of having 
ties with the international ALBA coalition 
promoted by Hugo Chávez from Venezuela (a 
suspicion that was never confirmed).  The 
ensuing agreement came to be known as the 
Pact of La Cresta in reference to the residence 
of the US Ambassador in Panama (La Prensa, 
January 24, 2009). 
Coordinadora (San Félix Accord) to 
forbid mining and hydroelectric 
concessions within the Comarca (Pedro 
Abrego personal communication).  This 
created uneasiness among private 
investors and government officials who 
regarded this measure as a violation of 
juridical security; particularly, for 
concessions that had already been 
granted such as the Cerro Colorado 
Mine and the Barro Blanco 
hydroelectric project.  Under this 
context, the dialogue approach of the 
Panameñista and CD governing parties 
served less to solve protracted conflicts 
than to gain time and legitimacy for 
government decisions that were already 
taken.  In this regards, dialogue, like the 
CDM, became a cleansing mechanism 
to promote development projects, and 
the discourse of a green economy 
served this cause with effectiveness and 
credibility, especially among 
mainstream environmental 
organizations that had forged strong 
economic ties with the business 
community. 
Likewise, the ecological 
packaging with which the violation of 
the human rights of indigenous 
communities in projects like Barro 
Blanco were cleaned up served as a 
justification for international financial 
institutions to undertake hydroelectric 
ventures as lesser evils in comparison 
with dirty fossil fuel electricity 
generation.  Based on this premise, the 
Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) 
approved the registration of the Barro 
Blanco hydroelectric project in 2011.  
Shortly before, the development banks 
of The Netherlands (FMO) and 
Germany (DEG) had decided to rescue 
the financing of the Project after 
GENISA had withdrawn its request for 
financing from the European Investment 
Bank (EIB).  In late 2010, the 
Ombudsman of EIB was preparing a 
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field trip to the affected Ngäbe 
communities as part of an investigation 
into compliance with social and 
environmental guidelines that had to be 
suddenly suspended when GENISA 
retrieved its request for financing.
27
  
Apparently, communications were not 
as efficient among these public finance 
institutions, or the approval of the 
carbon credits lent the Barro Blanco 
dam the cloak to be considered viable as 
a sustainable development and carbon 
mitigation initiative despite the strong 
opposition of the local communities. 
The beginning of the Barro 
Blanco construction work in 2011 
motivated a new cycle of mobilization 
on the part of the affected communities.  
The M10 occupied the entrance of the 
Project between March and May of that 
year bringing public attention and 
obstructing the continuation of 
construction work.  To this action of 
resistance, the Government of Panama 
responded with the preferred new 
practice for whitening environmentally 
damaging projects:  The initiation of 
dialogues without real guarantees that 
would allow the advance of 
construction work; the distraction and 
division of the communities; and, 
eventually, lead to the use of force to 
quell continued citizen protest. Indeed, 
this happened, for the first time in Barro 
Blanco, in May 2011, when the armed 
forces occupied the easement of the 
Pan-American Highway after the M10 
had abandoned the protest site for 
dialogue.  Public officials unilaterally 
left the dialogue table, and sent the 
armed forces to the entrance of the 
Project preventing the reinstatement of 
the M-10 protest camp, and 
safeguarding the uninterrupted entry 
                                                             
27
 
http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/compla
ints/cases/sg-e-2009-11-barro-blanco-
hydroelectric-project%20.htm 
and exit of machinery, equipment and 
staff of the promoting company. 
Between 2011-2014, and as the 
construction work progressed, the 
protest actions of the M10 and other 
groups against the construction of the 
Barro Blanco hydroelectric project were 
incessant. They were responded 
intermittently with cyclical periods of 
excessive use of force as in the second 
national mobilization of the Ngäbe 
people against mining and dams in 
February 2012, and endless sessions of 
supposed dialogues that were disguised 
with technical discussions, mostly 
behind closed doors and regrettably 
with the facilitation of the United 
Nations system.  The 2012 mobilization 
had been stronger than the one 
happening the year before leaving at 
least two people deceased, and 
prompting the meditation of the 
Catholic Church and the United 
Nations.  As the dialogue continued for 
weeks without reaching agreement on 
thorny questions like Barro Blanco, 
some sectors in Panama including 
progressive organizations began 
differentiating between those people 
who were willing to reach agreements, 
mostly led by the new Ngäbe General 
Cacique, Silvia Carrera; and other 
Ngäbe who maintained their claims 
without giving up any concessions.  The 
former were then portrayed as rational 
actors, and the latter as radicals with all 
the implications that label had on the 
credibility of those leaders.  At that 
point, in time, the M10 sided with the 
position of the General Cacique, and 
therefore was qualified as a “rational 
actor”. 
Based on that rationality, the 
dialogue table was divided in two:  A 
larger table to discuss details of 
decisions that had already reached 
consensus, most importantly banning 
mining in the Comarca.  The other 
dialogue table looked at issues on which 
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consensus had not yet been reached; 
figuring prominently the Barro Blanco 
hydroelectric project.  Based on this 
decision, and with the exclusion of 
sectors of the Ngäbe leadership 
opposing to this methodology, an 
agreement was signed between the 
Coordinadora, the General Cacique, the 
National Assembly, and the Ministry of 
Government in March 2012.  Based on 
that agreement, Law 11 of 2012 was 
passed banning mining on the Comarca 
Ngäbe-Bugle and establishing a special 
procedure for the approval of 
hydroelectric projects.  That procedure 
involved a share of revenues for the 
Comarca (5%), and a referendum, but 
did not apply to the Barro Blanco 
concession granted before that date. 
Since the new law did not cover 
Barro Blanco, a separate dialogue table 
was maintained about Barro Blanco 
with UN mediation and with the 
participation of the Coordinadora, and 
the local, regional, and general 
caciques.  Although the M10 was not 
technically a participant, they were 
allowed to observe the dialogue 
sessions that occurred at closed doors in 
the UN headquarter offices in Panama 
City.  Unfortunately, these 
conversations did not reach any 
conclusions although they produced 
important technical information that 
demonstrated that Ngäbe communities 
would be severely affected by the Barro 
Blanco reservoir.
28
  During the long 
dialogue sessions, there were two 
critical aspects in which the M10 
diverged from the Government and 
even the facilitators: 1. Who should 
represent the communities? 2. And, how 
to ensure compliance with international 
                                                             
28
http://www.pa.undp.org/content/panama/es/ho
me/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/perit
aje-independiente-de-la-represa-de-barro-
blanco--panama--re.html 
standards and norms for the protection 
of indigenous and human rights? 
In the first case, the National 
Government always opted to interpret 
the participation of the affected 
communities based on a European 
representative model, which found no 
support in the customary law of the 
Ngäbe people, and not even in the 
relevant Panamanian legislation. In 
particular, the Government of Panama 
made a risky interpretation of the 
authority of the caciques, who lack 
unilateral decision-making powers and 
administrative functions according to 
both Ngäbe customary law and national 
legislation. On the other hand, the 
Panamanian Government decided to 
ignore and manipulate the legitimate 
authority of the Ngäbe-Bugle General 
Congress, the highest decision-making 
authority regarding development 
projects according to the spirit of Law 
10 of 1997.  As explained above, the 
General Congress was created in 1978 
as a space for participation and 
consensus decision-making according to 
Ngäbe customary law and worldview 
(Jordan 2010a). 
The inappropriate use of the 
signatures of caciques and individual 
members of the congress boards, 
denying the legitimate rights of the 
communities directly affected to 
participate, also helped to reinforce 
attempts to wash the image of the 
territorial dispossession of the Ngäbe 
people with unauthorized signatures and 
agreements.  This happened in 
contravention of the best international 
standards requested by UN Special 
Rapporteur James Anaya in his report 
on the Status of Indigenous Peoples 
Rights in Panama (2014);
29
 in 
particular, the principle of Prior, Free 
                                                             
29
 http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/country-
reports/the-situation-of-indigenous-peoples-in-
panama 
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and Informed Consent (CLIP).  
Although international organizations 
like the UN, and even the Dutch and the 
German development banks, were also 
expected to abide to these standards, 
they comfortably leaned on a limited 
number of signatures to interpret that an 
agreement had already been reached 
with the affected population. 
The possibility of reaching 
agreements with indigenous 
representatives saving the complications 
of long discussions in community 
assemblies was inherent to advancing 
financial transactions necessary for 
market-based conservation instruments 
such as the CDM.  The consensus 
decision-making that characterize many 
ethnic communities becomes expensive 
and unpredictable for financial investors 
and engineering firms, including the 
actual possibility that a project be 
rejected with all the losses associated 
with opportunity, reputation, and 
transaction costs.  If Ngäbe customary 
law had been followed in dialogues 
occurring between 2011-2015, most 
possibly project cancellation would 
have been the outcome considering that 
the M10 and the larger population in 
Munä always maintained that the dam 
was unacceptable. 
The question then became why 
the M10 continually favored a dialogue 
strategy, and the Government continued 
with this approach cyclically despite 
unwillingness to cancel the 
hydroelectric project.  In the case of the 
Government, and the promoting 
company to a lesser extent, there was 
the expectation that the Ngäbe would 
eventually settle for a financial 
exchange for the loss of their lands and 
other damages; according to them that 
was a logical option considering the 
advance of the Project.  However, the 
M10 believed in the dialogue option 
following a different motivation, 
essentially conviction that their 
arguments were stronger, and therefore 
their reasons for project cancellation 
would eventually have to be recognized.  
The Government and other international 
actors searching for some sort of 
“rational” settlement never considered 
that the lands of the cultural community 
of Kiabda, Corregimiento of Bakama, 
District of Munä, Kodriri Region; could 
not possibly be exchanged for money; 
because they had a value that 
transcended any material consideration 
according to Mama Tata spirituality. 
According to the families of 
Kiabda and neighboring communities, 
the petroglyphs along the Tabasará 
River contained ancestral signs that had 
been interpreted years after the Mama 
Tata revelation.  Based on these signs, a 
uniquely Ngäbe system of reading and 
writing had been developed that not 
only represented better Ngäbe language, 
but was also tied to spirituality.  This 
reading and writing system was taught 
year round at the school of the cultural 
community of Kiabda; and every dry 
season, in the month of January, 
pilgrims gathered at the inscribed stones 
for Mama Tata ceremonies. 
Although M10 leaders held high 
expectations that national law would 
favor their cause, the Supreme Court of 
Justice of the Republic of Panama 
denied all of the legal remedies filed by 
the M10 to prevent the flooding of their 
collective lands and the protection of 
their livelihoods and sacred places in 
the Tabasará River. These legal actions 
included an administrative nullification 
against the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA), a request for 
protection of constitutional guarantees, 
and an appeal for annulment against the 
resolution approving a "forceful 
easement" on the collective lands of the 
Ngäbe families of Bakama. 
Unfortunately, the legal figure of 
a “forceful easement” as a new form of 
“clean expropriation” of collective lands 
V.2, N.1 – 2018 
ISSN 2526-6675 
REVISTA SOBRE ACESSO À JUSTIÇA E DIREITOS NAS AMÉRICAS ABYA YALA 
 
 
D
o
ss
iê
: T
H
E 
P
R
IV
A
TI
ZA
TI
O
N
 O
F 
EN
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
TA
L 
D
IS
C
O
U
R
SE
: 
 
cl
e
an
 d
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
te
rr
it
o
ri
al
it
y 
in
 w
e
st
e
rn
 P
an
am
a
 
 161
 
represented one of the latest 
contributions made by the continued 
resistance of the M10 to the twisted 
jurisprudence of Panama in relation to 
the rights of indigenous peoples.
30
  This 
juridical option appeared in Law 18 of 
2013 to solve the complex situation of 
forcing the use of collective lands for 
the sake of national interest.  At that 
moment, the National Authority for 
Public Services (ASEP) could not use 
the same procedures applied for 
individual land titles, because the 
Comarca legislation (Law 10 of 1997) 
did not allow for expropriation of the 
collective lands of the Ngäbe.  
Therefore a new law was created to 
allow the use (and eventual destruction) 
of these lands without an actual 
expropriation, and under the elusive 
concept of an easement on collective 
lands. 
Based on this dubious 
interpretation of national law and 
constitutional rights, ASEP issued an 
announcement that the authorities 
would enter into the farms of the 
Bakama families during the dry season 
of 2014.  In reaction, a number of 
protest camps were set up in the areas to 
be flooded by the reservoir by the M10 
and other protest groups.  During this 
period, and in the midst of a bitter 
electoral campaign, Ngäbe protestors 
faced the National Police on a daily 
basis trying to prevent the occupation 
and destruction of their farms.  After a 
highly unstable period (2009-2014), it 
was not easy to predict what the 
                                                             
30
 Ever since the Supreme Court of Justice 
provisionally suspended the construction of the 
Tabasará II hydroelectric project in 2000, there 
have been many other instances in which the 
National Assembly has altered the national 
legislation to allow the advance of hydroelectric 
projects on the Tabasará River.  As stated 
above, these included modifications to the 
General Environmental Law (Law 41 of 1998) 
and the Law that creates the Ngäbe-Bugle 
Indigenous Comarca (Law 10 of 1997). 
position would be of the different 
presidential candidates if they won the 
general elections.  The surprise victory 
of the Panameñista candidate, Juan 
Carlos Varela, offered some hope, as he 
was a main opponent to Ricardo 
Martinelli after being pushed to leave 
the government coalition in 2011.
31
 
 
New Promises and Failed 
Dialogues for Clean 
Development 
 
When the new Varela 
government offered an opening for 
dialogue, and ANAM suspended 
construction of the Barro Blanco dam 
temporarily in early 2015, the M10 
supported the creation of an Indigenous 
Commission to engage in conversations 
with the fledgling administration.
32
  As 
the UN was convened by the 
Government to facilitate this dialogue, 
and project cancellation was not ruled 
out as a possibility at the outset, the 
M10 position shifted from direct 
resistance into assertive argumentation.  
Based on these premises, the dialogue 
happened between February-May 2015 
with specific sessions focusing on the 
social, economic, environmental and 
cultural aspects of the Project.  For each 
of these themes, the Indigenous 
Commission also including the three 
local, regional, and general caciques as 
well as the Mayor of Munä, contributed 
information, comments, and 
argumentation against the continuation 
of the hydroelectric project.  At some 
point, the National Government that 
                                                             
31
 
https://www.prensa.com/getzalette_reyes/friccio
nes-previas-ruptura-
alianza_2_3194700501.html 
32
 
http://www.pa.undp.org/content/panama/es/hom
e/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/02/21/se-
instala-mesa-de-di-logo-sobre-proyecto-hidroel-
ctrico-barro-blanco.html 
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was represented by several ministers 
called upon the promoting company, 
GENISA, to listen to the grievances of 
the affected communities.  All dialogue 
sessions happened in the Catholic 
missionary center of Tolé, and were 
open for observation to any person 
deciding to listen to the different 
interventions. 
After a number of extended 
sessions, it was clear that the M10 was 
requesting project cancellation; but the 
Government was unwilling to assume 
the costs of such a bold move.  A sector 
of Ngäbe protestors mainly grouped in 
the M22 movement had decided not to 
participate in the dialogue, expressing 
distrust against the caciques and even 
against the M10.  However, the M10 
had sided with “rational” actors willing 
to dedicate long hours with UN 
mediation to convince the Government 
this project should not move forward.  
By April 2015, it appeared that the 
Government blamed the promoting 
company GENISA for all of the ills of 
the Project as well as for the animosity 
of the local communities.  Based on that 
conviction, now Vice-President and 
head of the government negotiating 
commission, Isabel de Saint Malo, 
offered continuation of the hydroelectric 
project only replacing the promoting 
company.  At such point, the dialogue 
essentially came to a halt as the 
Indigenous Commission strongly 
rejected this option.  In response, the 
Government proposed the creation of a 
technical commission to search for 
alternatives to continue with the Project. 
Days before the final collapse of 
the dialogue, the daily La Estrella de 
Panamá referred to a letter from FMO, 
DEG and BCIE warning the 
Government of Panama of the potential 
consequences that project cancellation 
could have on the international 
investment climate.
33
  This letter went 
in hand with the prevailing position of 
business sectors in Panama who 
expressed deep concern about the 
juridical security of foreign investors, 
and the ripple effects that might 
originate from the cancellation of Barro 
Blanco. 
In the face of continuous denial 
of their own juridical security for 
collective ownership of Comarca lands, 
the M10 had no other option than 
appealing to public opinion and to 
international human rights bodies trying 
to elicit a boomerang effect as described 
by Keck and Sikkink (1998).  In 2014, 
they had filed a petition to the new 
Independent Complaint Mechanism 
(ICM) of FMO, who released a joint 
report with DEG on May 29, 2015.  
According to this report, "“while the 
[loan] agreement was reached prior to 
significant construction, significant 
issues related to social and 
environmental impact and, in particular, 
issues related to the rights of indigenous 
peoples were not completely assessed 
prior to the [loan] agreement.”.34 
Although this public recognition 
at the international level represented a 
pyrrhic victory for M10 when most of 
the Barro Blanco dam was already 
completed, and the Government was not 
willing to consider the possibility of 
project cancellation, this statement also 
revealed the pitfalls of the deceptive 
discourse of clean development for 
climate change mitigation.  Based on 
the universality of human rights, UN 
bodies such as the UNFCCC Secretariat 
had to ensure that all their activities 
complied with UN conventions for the 
protection of human rights.  In addition, 
the CDM purpose was allegedly not 
                                                             
33
 
http://laestrella.com.pa/panama/nacional/bancos
-expresan-preocupacion/23864070 
34
 https://www.fmo.nl/independent-complaints-
mechanism 
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only climate change mitigation, but also 
sustainable development.  Evidently, the 
harm soon to be caused to the 
communities, their livelihoods and 
sacred sites ran against both principles 
of human rights and sustainable 
development. 
In spite of these irreconcilable 
contradictions, the UN representation in 
Panama continued its engagement in the 
Barro Blanco controversy using funds 
provided by two UNDP cooperation 
projects.
35
  After August 2015, and 
based on an agreement signed by the 
three caciques, a series of technical 
meetings were held closed doors, and 
without the participation of the M10 
that then began to be represented as a 
radical group refusing to engage in 
dialogue.  It was not clear, whether 
these meetings would lead to a new 
agreement, or if they allowed the 
continuation of the Project.  However, 
that same month ANAM lifted the 
temporary suspension of the Project, 
and issued a fine against GENISA 
In April 2016, M22 protestors 
who had previously moved their protest 
camp close to the dam site were notified 
that flooding would happen in the next 
few days; no such meeting happened in 
the Bakama communities to be directly 
flooded by the reservoir.  For this 
reason, they were surprised when ASEP 
issued an announcement on Sunday 
May 22 saying that “test flooding” 
would start two days later.  Protests 
erupted by Ngäbe people living in 
different parts of the country when the 
M22 protest camp was forcefully 
removed on the evening of May 23.
36
  
As the waters rose towards Bakama, the 
M10 families maintained their position 
                                                             
35 
https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECUP
ages/CaseFile.aspx?ItemID=22 
36 https://intercontinentalcry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/BARRO-BLANCO.-
INFORME-DDHH-22-6-16.pdf 
that they would never leave, or accept 
any payments for their sacred lands.  
After finally sending an official 
delegation to Kiabda, in June the 
Government announced that the “test 
flooding” would be temporarily 
suspended until an agreement could 
reached with the caciques.
37
 
On August 19, flooding resumed 
now nearing the stones with the 
ancestral signs revered by Mama Tata.  
Three days later a signing ceremony 
organized by the Government in the 
capital of the Comarca, Buäbdi, ended 
up in a fiasco.
38
  Although the document 
was signed by the three caciques, the 
ceremony took hours to complete when 
the local and regional cacique were 
surrounded by Ngäbe people, mostly 
women, asking them to explain the 
content of the document.  As tensions 
rose, the ceremony was moved from an 
open air setting to the hall of a local 
school with a line of guards separating 
the caciques, UN representatives, 
government ministers, and President 
Varela from the furious audience.  Right 
when the agreement was being signed 
protestors threw rocks to the main table 
finishing the ceremony. 
In the coming days, protests 
erupted in the entire country, especially 
in the Pan-American Highway along the 
Comarca and in the distant province of 
Bocas del Toro.  The worst police 
repression occurred in the community 
of Gualaquita, Bocas del Toro, where 
followers of Mama Tata had 
concentrated to protest against the 
completion of the flooding.
39
  As the 
                                                             
37 https://www.tvn-
2.com/nacionales/Suspenden-llenado-de-
prueba-proyecto-Barro-
Blanco_0_4517548271.html 
38 https://news.mongabay.com/2016/08/photos-
panama-revives-stalled-dam-over-strong-
indigenous-opposition/ 
39 
http://www.telemetro.com/nacionales/enfrentam
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waters of the reservoir covered the 
engraved stones, community trails, 
dwellings, water sources, forests and 
farms, the M10 inhabitants of Bakama 
clung to their decision to remain in their 
territory regardless of the arbitrary 
flooding.  At this point, the national 
media highlighted the virtues of the 
agreement by which a third party was 
expected to replace GENISA in the 
operation of the dam, and the Comarca 
was destined to receive a share of the 
revenues regardless of the opposition of 
the local communities (15%). 
The celebration was short-lived 
when the Ngäbe-Bugle General 
Congress voted against approval of the 
agreement on September 17, 2016.
40
  
This decision closed off the possibility 
of replacing GENISA as an operator of 
the dam; and left the Government of 
Panama at an uncomfortable position in 
front of international financial 
institutions and human rights bodies.   
For this reason, the decision of ANAM 
to retrieve the letter of approval for 
Barro Blanco to receive carbon credits 
should not come as any surprise.
41
  
Announced at the Twenty Second 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 
(COP22) in Marrakech, Morocco, in 
November 2016, the decision of ANAM 
to revoke the approval of the Barro 
Blanco hydroelectric project for the 
                                                                                  
ientos-Bocas-Toro-Barro-
Blanco_0_947905574.html 
https://www.tvn-2.com/nacionales/paso-
Gualaquita_0_4561043880.html 
http://otramerica.com/radar/barro-blanco-
acuerdo-acuerdo/3455 
40 https://news.mongabay.com/2016/10/barro-
blanco-dam-in-limbo-after-ngabe-bugle-
congress-rejects-agreement/ 
https://www.prensa.com/provincias/Congreso-
General-Bugle-Barro-
Blanco_0_4577542238.html 
41 
https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2016/11/10/press
-statement-in-landmark-decision-panama-
withdraws-un-registration-for-barro-blanco-
hydrodam-project/ 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
could be interpreted as a strategy to 
clean the record after the absolute 
failure of a negotiated solution. The 
logic behind market-based 
environmental transactions was an 
exchange between two parties who were 
willing to give up in order to receiving a 
benefit.  When a party is not willing to 
concede what they consider sacred and 
irreplaceable, the scenario of a 
successful win-win game is impossible, 
and ultimately reluctant actors may be 
considered irrational, at least for those 
others seeking to maximize profit. 
Since the filling of the reservoir, 
three major floods have happened in the 
Bakama communities; and mosquitoes, 
disease, mud, lack of water and 
motivation, strain living conditions.  
Despite this dismal situation, the Ngäbe 
communities refuse to leave their 
collective lands even when they are 
living literally at the edge of the water.  
The Mama Tata celebrations at the 
Kiabda stone engravings have ceased to 
happen again, at least in the last two 
years.
42
  However, the communities 
have remained loyal to their own 
determination of living along the 
Tabasará River; not accepting solutions 
from outside forces and selling the lands 
of their forbearers. 
In April 2018, the new 
complaint mechanism of UNDP – 
Social and Environmental Compliance 
Unit (SECU), issued a draft report about 
the participation of this agency in the 
process of dialogue between 2015-
                                                             
42
 At some point, Government officials argued 
the rocks would be uncovered every year during 
the dry season when the Mama Tata pilgrimage 
usually happened.  Regrettably, this never 
happened in 2017 and 2018, and areas 
uncovered in those seasons were completely 
unusable because of the large mud deposits 
accumulating in the reservoir. 
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2016.
43
  The report stated that:  “UNDP 
did not meet requirements for due 
diligence, transparency, 
consultation/consent, and Indigenous 
Peoples rights after the Roundtable 
Dialogue was concluded, in 
approximately June 2015” (p. 4 iv). 
Clearly, the Ngäbe have not yet been 
able to remove all the dirt thrown up on 
their land.  At least, however, and for 
the moment, they have been able to 
leave much of that unclean development 
in evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Barro Blanco warns against the 
pitfalls of market environmentalism 
when confronted with an indigenous 
vision of life with different values, 
preferences and expectations.  Although 
environmental problems represent 
urgent challenges at the global level, 
any solutions must recognize power 
differentials, non-capitalistic 
perspectives and cultural difference, 
thus avoiding the risk of becoming new 
forms of environmental imperialism in 
the XXI century. 
After the debacle of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the 
Kyoto Protocol, currently superseded by 
yet undefined new mechanisms 
suggested in the Paris Agreement 
(2015), the environment and 
development community must 
reexamine the actual transformative 
capacity of the discourse of a green 
economy.  As stated by Wanner (2015), 
“greening the economy and associated 
strategies of green growth divert 
attention from the social and political 
dimensions of sustainability and issues 
of social and international justice”. 
                                                             
43
https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECU
_Documents/SECU0004_Draft%20Investigatio
n%20Reportfcb7d7c8c5384d829d0eefed714e78
46.pdf 
In spite of the UN carbon 
certification being terminated with the 
withdrawal letter of the Government of 
Panama; the labeling of the Barro 
Blanco dam as a form of sustainable 
and clean development served to 
conceal a clear instance of “green 
grabbing”. Despite the appearance of 
dialogue, the rightful owners of the land 
were ultimately dispossessed through 
forceful means when the floodwaters 
began to rise (Fairhead et al. 2012).  
Whether this will represent a tendency 
in new “ecological distribution 
conflicts” throughout the world remains 
to be seen (Martínez-Alier 2016); yet 
the construction and eventual de-
construction of a discourse of clean 
development sends warning signs that 
should not be disregarded. 
In the historical conflict between 
the Ngäbe indigenous peoples and the 
Government of Panama, greening 
became a failed strategy to justify 
expropriation and commodification of 
natural resources.  As much as 
evangelization and civilization were 
utilized in the past, continuous conflict 
over natural resources will probably 
generate new discourses and 
rationalities that will clash with 
indigenous worldviews, interests and 
preferences.  This seemed to be the 
ultimate goal of the ideational battle 
over the Tabasará dams that spanned 
more than forty years, and more than 
seven different government 
administrations from every major 
political party in Panama. The outcome 
was possibly known and assumed by the 
M10 protestors since the very 
beginning, both in the streets and in the 
dialogue tables.  However, the 
discussion continues as of how you 
define development, quality of life and 
happiness from different perspectives. 
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